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Reviewed by Robert Jackson, Manchester Metropolitan University.
Some thinkers’ ideas have been summarized and distilled with such
frequency that the prevailing image of their thought is worn smooth through
repetition. The presentation of their theory acquires a familiarity that reduces
its capacity to surprise us with abrasive insight. Georg Lukács is an example
of such a thinker, and the notion of rei cation, elaborated in History and Class
Consciousness (1923; hereafter, HCC), is such an idea. Building on Marx’s
discussion of the fetishism of commodities in his critique of political
economy, Lukács’s distinctive contribution was the extension of this
phenomenon beyond the economic realm, reframing the commodity-form as
the universal structuring principle of all aspects of capitalist society. As the
archetypical philosopher of Western Marxism, the dominant image of the
early Lukács is that of an intellectual shaped by a tradition of Romantic anti-
capitalism, who then fashioned a Hegelian version of Marxism that
emphasized the role of class consciousness in history and a mediated
conception of the social totality.
While acknowledged as a seminal  gure in twentieth-century intellectual life,
helping to inspire the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, the standard
interpretation regards Lukács’s reconstruction of Marxism as outmoded and
exhausted. Despite his materialist pretensions, this reading holds that
Lukács’s philosophy of praxis recreates a form of idealism by substituting the
proletariat for the demiurge of the Hegelian Weltgeist (or the Fichtean
“identical subject-object,” positing the world through a moment of practice).
Even Theodor Adorno and Jürgen Habermas, who acknowledge signi cant
inheritances from Lukács’s thought, level the charge that Lukács’s e orts lead
him towards idealism by eliding the concepts of rei cation and rational
objecti cation. Indeed, Lukács himself reinforces this assessment through
the self-criticism he penned in 1967 as the Preface (HCC, ix–xxxix) for the
republication of HCC.
Richard Westerman would like us to rethink this standard interpretation of
Lukács. In Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism, he argues that there has
been an “excessive weight hitherto placed on Lukács’s debts to classical
German philosophy.” (19) Reading Lukács’s Heidelberg drafts of a philosophy
of art and aesthetics (1912–18), Westerman foregrounds the in uence on his
thought of a “phenomenological quartet” of less-discussed  gures: Alois
Riegl, Konrad Fiedler, Emil Lask, and Edmund Husserl. Westerman argues
that a contextualized reading of the later essays in HCC, written in Vienna in
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1922 during a moment of “enforced leisure” (HCC, xli), presents a new and
unfamiliar picture of Lukács’s work.
To frame this reading, Westerman reconstructs Lukács’s defence of aesthetic
formalism in his early e orts at a philosophy of art. In these Heidelberg
drafts, Lukács aims to preserve the independence of a sphere of value
against the relativizing tendencies of the dominant psychologistic accounts of
art in late nineteenth-century German thought. Tracing the genealogy of neo-
Kantianism through Hermann Lotze’s notion of “domains of validity” (39),
Westerman shows how Lukács investigated these conditions of validity in the
aesthetic sphere. Inspired by Fiedler’s insistence that the work of art does not
simply re ect the external world, Lukács sought out a systematic concept to
explain artistic style “on its own terms.” He found this in Riegl’s analysis of
Kunstwollen, “a stylistic representation of both the nature of objective reality
and the relation of the individual to that reality prevailing in a given society”
(47), which depersonalized the principle of form in the work of art. As
Westerman explains, Lukács uses this concept to point to “the immanent
structures that determine the forms of an artwork and at the same time
de ne the position of the subject within the totality.” (48)
Drawing also on sources beyond the horizon of aesthetic philosophies, the
book leads us through Lukács’s engagement with Husserl’s Logical
Investigations and Ideas, in particular the model of intentionality and the
phenomenological epoché. Lukács’s Heidelberg writings repurpose these
Husserlian tools, originally developed for acts of consciousness, to relate to
the meaning of artworks and wider social phenomena. In these writings,
Lukács refers repeatedly to his own framework as “phenomenological,” albeit
appropriating Husserl’s concepts in a speci cally neo-Kantian manner that is
preoccupied “with the object rather than with mental acts.” (70) For anyone
who has ever puzzled over the references to  gures such as Fiedler, Riegl,
and Husserl in Lukács’s famous rei cation essay in HCC, Westerman’s
discussions illuminate the intellectual crosscurrents clashing, fusing and
informing that work.
Westerman also delineates the elements of Lask’s philosophy that can be
seen as pre gurations of Lukács’s critique of capitalist rei cation. In
particular, Lask’s unorthodox reading of Fichte and his theory of aletheiology
(“an ontological theory of meaning grounded in the concept of truth” [57])
deal with problems familiar to readers of Lukács, such as the “irrational gap,”
and with the “theoretical-contemplative” structuring of subject-object
relations. (58) Crucially, we  nd here a conception of subjectivity that is very
far from a self-positing “subject-creator” in the standard reading of Lukács,
but rather one that emphasizes the “secondary, derived role” of the subject,
which is “circumscribed by the objectively determined validity forms of its
relation to the object.” (59)
Drawing out the key categories deployed in Lukács’s early Heidelberg
aesthetics, Westerman makes the case for the innovative combination of
these neo-Kantian and phenomenological in uences in the development of
Lukács’s later social theory. Westerman argues that we must be attentive to
how Lukács’s experiments in uence the development of key terms – such as
totality, standpoint, and the relation between subject and object – in his later
analysis of capitalist rei cation. One of the formidable strengths of this book
is its  uid style and clear signposting that makes the often-di cult subject
material very readable. Westerman peppers the narrative with asides and
anecdotes (as well as the occasional joke about Bob Dylan).
The carefully structured argument is methodically unpacked in subsequent
chapters, elaborating what Westerman calls a “phenomenological reading” of
Lukács’s work through a substantive account of HCC. This reading locates
three di erent levels in Lukács’s framework, which – borrowing Heideggerian
terminology – Westerman classi es as the phenomenological, the ontic, and
the ontological. The  rst examines “the ways speci c objects appear or the
individual’s direct relationship to the social world.” (23) The forms of this
“phenomenological” level of appearance are not understood as “forms of
News (22)
QUOTATIONS
When a man has  lled his
mouth so full of food that
for this reason he cannot
eat and it must end with
his dying of hunger, does
giving food to him consist
in stu ng his mouth even
more or, instead, in taking
a little away so that he can
eat?
— Kierkegaard, Postscript
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knowledge” that convey a  awed version of “true reality,” but as “what society
and social objects are, because they govern the intentional practices that
constitute objects as socially meaningful.” (144)
The second “ontic” level uncovers the “overall structure of reality under
capitalism,” which deals with the “interaction between objects” (23), namely
the logic of the commodity structure. For Westerman, Lukács takes up Georg
Simmel’s analysis of the “logic of social relationships” and of the role of social
form in determining the ontology of social being, while also going beyond
Simmel in “historical speci city” and “ontological ambitiousness.” (130) Finally,
the roots of this “ontic reality” are located in a deeper ontological level, “from
which that reality coheres as a totality that makes sense on its own terms.”
(145) While a brief review cannot do justice to this detailed reconstruction, it
is worth pointing towards the insightful analysis that Westerman provides of
the precise role of key in uences on Lukács’s work. Westerman counters the
common assumption that Lukács adopts a Hegelian theory of subjectivity,
arguing that the decisive content that Lukács absorbs from Hegel originates
in the ontological categories of the Science of Logic, such as essence and
appearance. (217)
One of the particular merits of Westerman’s phenomenological reading is
that it undermines the established account of Lukács’s theory of rei cation as
restricted to distortion of consciousness conceived in merely epistemic
terms. Building on the work of Andrew Feenberg, Westerman reads Lukács’s
use of the term “consciousness” to mean “something similar to the
anthropological notion of culture.” (14) At the same time, Westerman seeks to
go beyond Feenberg’s understanding by including in his analysis “the idea of
mental states, the concepts of subject and object as questions inherent to it,
the notion of reality, the themes of experience and memory, and the
problem of the  rst-person perspective.” (15)
Moreover, Westerman actively uses the distinction between the early essays
in HCC and those drafted (or re-drafted) in 1922 to argue for the “jettisoning”
of certain problematic and misleading concepts, such as the notion of
“imputed” or “ascribed” class consciousness, from his “phenomenological”
account of Lukács. (104f.) While this manoeuvre has the advantage of
unambiguously distancing Lukács’s conception from vulgar “false-
consciousness” versions of Marxism, it also potentially defuses some of the
ideological-critical capacities of his framework.
Westerman makes the case for 1922 as a decisive moment in the
development of Lukács’s theory of rei cation, contrasting the “conventional”
epistemological treatment of consciousness in Lukács’s early “naïve” and
“messianic” Marxist writings (1919–21) to the phenomenological account
found in the later essays of HCC. While this binary characterization of
positions may play a necessary analytical function in the argument, I  nd the
discussion of Lukács’s later phenomenological conception more convincing
than the philological evidence provided to show that his earlier Marxist work
deployed a crudely epistemological conception. Did Lukács’s early Marxist
essays, as Westerman suggests, merely seek to add more “facts” to the
bourgeois perception? (101) I would suggest that the moment of
transformational intensity that marks Lukács’s life at this point merits further
scrutiny. Indeed, an expanded study of the particular character of Lukács’s
“messianism,” and its relation to what Slavoj Žižek described in The Puppet
and the Dwarf as the “condensed time of the Event” (PD, 135), might be a
fruitful encounter for Westerman’s phenomenological approach.
In the book, Westerman skilfully identi es di erent registers through which
Lukács’s thought moves during the various phases of his development. He
distinguishes between the everyday experiences examined by Lukács’s early
sociological account of works of art, and the treatment of “peak” or “pinnacle”
aesthetic experiences in his formalist Heidelberg works. (60) Additional
exploration of this contraposition of the everyday experience and the rarity
of “utopian” peak experience in Lukács’s earlier works would perhaps  nd
echoes in his later analysis of everyday life in bourgeois society as the
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“permanent crisis of capitalism.” (HCC, 40) Westerman touches on the theme
of crisis in his discussion of Lukács’s use of Kierkegaard to think through the
possibility of  nding an immanent moral imperative to revolution. Further
discussion of the wider role of crisis in Lukács’s project of disrupting
rei cation might also be illuminating for Westerman’s phenomenological
reading.
While ultimately regarding Lukács’s privileging of the proletariat in the project
of overcoming rei cation as a failure, Westerman argues that his
phenomenological version of Lukács “fails in more interesting ways than is
normally understood to be the case.” (4) Thus, the book identi es the
overlooked contribution that Lukács makes to our understanding of the
formation of collective identity, in particular providing “a non-essentializing
way to speak about personal and social identity.” (230) Westerman also
reconstructs the often-misunderstood relationship between the social and
the natural in Lukács’s thought, in which Lukács proposes social relations
de ned by a “new form of reason” that “would no longer need to impose
abstract demands on material reality.” (269)
The  nal section of Westerman’s book extends its reach beyond the scope of
HCC. In particular, the concluding chapter o ers tantalizing indications of
ways to develop this reading to deliver critical engagements with subsequent
theorists, such as Habermas and Fredric Jameson. This leaves the reader
hoping for extended elaborations of these promises in future, as well as
further development of the re ections on  gures such as Moishe Postone
and Axel Honneth within the preceding chapters. Above all, Westerman’s
conception of the development of Lukács’s writings, not as a linear
development between sociological, formalist, and Marxist phases, but as a
more complex recon guration of unexpected sources conveys in a
provocative and exciting way the enduring relevance of Lukács’s thought
today. 
Lukács’s Phenomenology of Capitalism is a major contribution to the recent
season of Lukács studies, and it succeeds in o ering both a new and a
convincing perspective on Lukács’s thought. It complements other
publications, such as Konstantinos Kavoulakos’s Georg Lukács’s Philosophy of
Praxis (2018), which also foregrounds underexplored sources of Lukács’s
attempt to formulate a theory of transformative praxis. While the recent
closure of the Lukács Archívum in Budapest by the reactionary regime of
Viktor Orbán imbues this interest in Lukács with a direct sense of urgency,
these inquiries are also essential reading for a wider audience engaged in
renewed questioning of the role of critical thought in our own times.
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